The Problem of Truth
It is manifest that
there is nothing which men have ever said that is not liable to opposition.
Where the will dissents, the mind also dissents: under the bias of opposing
judgment it joins battle, and denies the assertions to which it objects....
For decisions once formed cling with excessive obstinacy: and the passion
of controversy cannot be driven from the course it has taken, when the
will is not subject to the reason. Enquiry after truth gives way to the
search for proofs of what we wish to believe; desire is paramount over
truth. Then the theories we concoct build themselves on names rather than
things; the logic of truth gives place to the logic of prejudice
a logic which the will adjusts to defend its fancies, not one which stimulates
the will through the understanding of truth by the reason. From these defects
of partisan spirit arise all controversies between opposing theories. Then
follows an obstinate battle between truth asserting itself, and prejudice
defending itself: truth maintains its ground and prejudice resists. But
if desire had not forestalled reason, if the understanding of the truth
had moved us to desire what was true
instead of trying to set up our desires as doctrines
we should let our doctrines dictate our desires. There would be no contradiction
of the truth, for every one would begin by desiring what was true, not
by defending the truth of that which he desired.
St. Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, X:i
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Last modified February 24, 1999.